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Abstract. The paper considers risk in the context of the main characteristics of non-classical epistemology. It 
states that non-classical epistemology is characterized by transformation, according to which the major priority of 
cognitive activity shifts the focus from the present to the past. In this situation a subject is keen not on what he or 
she has learnt but on what can be learnt. Truth being a crucial criterion of scientific knowledge is becoming of less 
priority, while risk is becoming more and more significant and acts as one of the major epistemology 
measurements. Risk is gaining the status of epistemological phenomenon, which shows a growing degree of 
uncertainty as a cognitive process background and the necessity for a subject to learn the world (make decisions) 
under the conditions of uncertainty degree strengthening. The author states that risk is a comprehensive notion and 
it obtains a base value for all other aspects of its application, specifically, in the role of epistemological 
phenomenon. 
Introduction 
Nowadays, epistemology as a branch of philosophy is in 
the state of transformation. The essence of 
transformation is that it has not obtained any distinct 
outline and is in the state of uncertainty. It is more 
accurate to say that epistemology is represented by a 
diverse realm of approaches, the correlation of which is 
not possible (evolutionary epistemology, social 
epistemology, constructivist epistemology, etc.). 
Nevertheless, some scientists (V.A. Lektorskij, U.S. 
Morkina, etc.) suppose that the majority of 
epistemological approaches can be united by a number 
of characteristics (which will be discussed later in the 
paper) and presented as non-classical epistemology 
being a system of the most characteristic features and 
tendencies of the whole variety of epistemological 
branches. 
This idea is supported by some reasons, and one of 
them is the following: the core epistemological issue is 
the issue on knowledge as a human activity 
phenomenon. The approaches to studying the nature of 
knowledge have become more diverse and gained the 
touch of novelty and unconventionality. According to 
V.A. Lektorskij, non-classical epistemology is not only a 
new stage in epistemology development, but also a new 
way of understanding reality and human nature. Non-
classical epistemology provides a new field for research, 
particularly important for understanding modern social 
and cultural processes [1]. 
Within this framework, finding new aspects of 
arranging and understanding cognitive activity as well as 
specifying the features of humans’ cognitive activity will 
be considered rather natural. Appealing to risk, which 
the author suggests to view as an epistemological 
phenomenon, is a sociocultural novelty concerning non-
classical representation of cognitive activity [2,3,4]. 
The Results and discussion 
Initially, risk was not connected to cognitive activity but 
was associated with trade and finance. G. Behmann 
states that the notions of uncertainty and risk appeared in 
the Middle Ages with regard to the doctrine of usury [5]. 
Later, the notion gained other meanings, which further 
have led to the representation expressing hope to 
overcome the uncertainties of the future. According to G. 
Behmann, at the end of XVI century the notion “risk” 
lost its religious meaning (the irreligion risk was 
connected with a high risk of ruining the sole for the 
future) and gained a pure economic one. Marine 
navigation and trade in distant countries created social 
contexts based on situations of risk. Risk (from Italian 
“riscare” – “to weigh”) denotes, in this case, the 
opportunity to face uncertain and dangerous future [5].  
The economic component of risk in the form of 
potential threat for the goods, assets, production rapidly 
gained a social characteristic as well, due to the fast 
industrial production development [6]. However, the 
notion of risk did not enter the field of epistemology, 
while the core concepts of the classical epistemology 
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period were presented by objectiveness, truth, science 
centralism. And, such characteristics of knowledge and 
cognitive activity had to assure the result (knowledge) 
reliability, and eliminated any mistake and failure from a 
subject. Factually, these cognitive activity criteria 
guaranteed non-obtainment of a dangerous and 
unreliable result. 
Modern society is a different matter, while it needs a 
lot of metaphors to characterize its diversity: post-
industrial society, knowledge society, information 
society, risk society, etc. The metaphors themselves 
indicate multistructurality of such society and the nature 
of processes in it. Nowadays, there is a tendency to 
sophisticate a lifestyle pattern in terms of both social and 
natural aspects. This sophistication causes the increased 
uncertainty in the world perception of individuals and 
society, disrupts the conventional attitudes and the 
methods of developing the knowledge of the world. In 
the circumstances, not only epistemology but also other 
social systems find themselves in this uncertain situation. 
Actually, even education, being a social institution, 
which is, as a rule, the most conservative component of 
the social body, is constrained to reconsider its aims and 
means of functioning.  
Epistemology itself undergoes considerable changes 
as well as the other fields of science, philosophy and 
knowledge do. The cognition of a modern man has 
reached the highest level and its further development 
towards cognitive activity requires a considerable 
foundation of equipment, finance, public support, etc. 
Nowadays, it is not enough for a scientist to have a 
purely theoretical interest, which was sufficient for 
cognitive activity in the age of classical science. To set 
up a fundamental scientific research it is necessary to 
unite and motivate many people who may possibly have 
incomplete understanding of cognitive activity but are 
indispensable for carrying out the research. This side of 
social practice does not directly concern epistemological 
aspect but plays an important role in cognitive activity 
development. 
Moreover, under the present conditions of initiating 
any applied research, a customer can demand the 
desirable outcome, setting aside substantive and 
organizational aspects of cognition. The experience of 
conducting applied research has shown that scientists are 
bound to do everything possible to obtain this outcome. 
It is apparent that such processes in the sphere of 
cognition do not contribute to its stability. Thus, every 
epistemological practice requires special interpretation. 
Not accidentally, some researchers state that the truth in 
present epistemology is undervalued; therefore, it is 
impossible to attempt to ascribe a cognitive outcome to a 
single factor, which is implied by the notion of truth. 
This situation is caused by the complexity of the modern 
world. Therefore, the diversity of developing 
epistemologies assumes that each of them is oriented to 
understanding of one of the world’s constituent parts. It 
is natural that in this situation uncertainty as a state of 
knowledge is a rather significant element of any 
cognitive context. 
For greater systemization of non-classical 
epistemology characteristics let us analyze its very 
characteristics, which underline the specificity of the 
modern situation. Particularly, addressing the outcomes 
of non-classical epistemology by U.S. Morkina appears 
to be rather appropriate while she carried out significant 
analysis of the approaches to non-classical epistemology 
estimation and revealed 21 characteristics of the latter. 
The following features of non-classical epistemology 
prove the importance of measuring cognition by means 
of risk: 1) the world of natural phenomena does not exist 
apart from observers and their knowledge - it is 
subjective; 2) world characteristics depend on the 
observer’s priorities and interests; 4) scientific 
knowledge does not reveal or store the outer world 
genuine features; 9) scientific knowledge implies the 
physical world description mediated by various cultural 
resources; 15) scientific knowledge is not an 
epistemologically privileged knowledge case; 18) 
rejection of fundamentalism; 20) rejection of science 
centralism [7]. 
As the given characteristics show, cognitive activity 
in non-classical epistemology is treated as a complex and 
diverse process not adhere to any versatile constants. 
Besides, the role of a subject (an individual or a group) is 
becoming important; their role in cognition and the 
degree of presence in knowledge is increasing. But it 
should be mentioned that a considerable influence of a 
subject on the cognition process should not be connected 
with solipsism. If in the latter the world is, factually, the 
subject’s own construction, the subject’s activity in non-
classical epistemology is conditioned by the world order 
complexity, speed of processes, globalization, and the 
complementary knowledge specialization. Today, a 
single person is unable to act as a universal specialist 
with the required potential. The humanity and science 
face global problems, cognition of which is beyond a 
single person ability (moreover, everyday problems 
should be solved as well). To understand and solve such 
problems the efforts of various research teams from 
different fields of knowledge are required together with 
the necessity to involve the efforts of states and the 
world community.  
It is not a coincidence that the role of an expert form 
of cognitive activity has become reinforced. Frequently, 
a researcher does not have an opportunity to clearly 
justify the choice of one or another solution. In this case 
it is rather natural for the researcher to use expert 
evaluation. To provide the given technique with a clearer 
solution, the scientists strive for attracting the widest 
possible range of experts from different fields of 
knowledge, which makes a complex solution even more 
complicated. As L.A. Mikeshina states, since evaluation 
is always subjective and depends on the peculiarities and 
purposes of the subject who makes it, modern methods 
of attracting experts seek to provide a more fully 
engagement of specialists of different profiles, their 
selection improvement and evaluations harmonization. 
Great importance is attached to the procedure aimed at 
reducing the psychological influence of the reasons 
decreasing expert solutions effectiveness, among which 
are mutual persuasion, authorities influence, etc. [8].  
But the most important thing is that greater 
involvement of experts (not only scientist) leads to the 
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intersection of various social being measurements: 
cognitive, social, cultural, natural, etc. According to L.A. 
Mikeshina, the methods of expert evaluations make the 
system of techniques for scientific and technical 
problems solution more flexible and optimal, and also 
act as the channels for the penetration of politico-social, 
culture-historical, socio-psychological factors into the 
essence of scientific and technical knowledge gained in 
the process of problem solving [8].  
The scope of the specialists involved increases not 
only the opportunities to find effective solutions, but also 
the degree of uncertainty and risk. On the one hand, risk 
has social genesis while the consequences of solutions 
for the society and individual are considered, and, on the 
other hand, risk is closely connected with cognition 
while the possible consequences are based on someone’s 
subjective solution. Actually, epistemological risk 
measurement indicates the indivisibility of the social 
factor and scientific cognition. U. Bek pointed out that 
claims of scientific rationality concerning the objective 
definition of the level of risk in dangerous situations 
constantly contradict themselves while they are based on 
the house of cards of speculations and range only inside 
probability statements; security prospects contained in 
them cannot be refuted even by actual accidents [9].  
Risk appears to be an essential measurement of 
cognitive activity not only due to the application of 
expert evaluation. Risk acts as an integral part of an 
individual’s world perception. When the world 
perception (cognition) is presented as a process, in the 
scope of which a person takes decisions, different 
degrees of uncertainty initiate risk like a mechanism 
of finding solutions under the conditions of complete 
clarity absence. The smaller such clarity is, the more 
responsibility will be imposed on a subject (person), 
and, consequently, when making choice a person 
forms such measurement of one’s own activity (and 
cognition as well) as risk. As V.S. Diev states, risk is 
the solution outcome and is always connected with the 
subject who not only makes choice but also considers 
the probability of possible events and losses 
connected with it. Risk is an integrated index 
combining the evaluations of solutions probability and 
the quantitative characteristics of its consequences as 
well [10]. 
Risk does exist in cognition while it is connected 
with a subject and represents the limitation of his/her 
heuristic choice. This complexity is revealed in the 
situations when a subject has not made a choice yet and 
there is a wide range of possible options to be chosen, he 
or she, actually, has to risk and make choice. Moreover, 
having made such choice the subject merely specifies 
risk. And, herein lies the peculiarity of cognitive activity 
in non-classical epistemology: risk should be specified. 
It cannot be eliminated but is possible to be specified. In 
this case the subject has a clearer vision of one or 
another decision outcome and, therefore, can evaluate 
epistemological consequences better.  
Essentially, in such situations a subject must choose 
one uncertainty from the range of possible ones. It means 
that the researcher will make the choice only in the scope 
of the sphere he feels to be concerned with. But, 
considering the fact that a researcher (a team of 
researchers) faces the global problem (and this is the 
kind of problems non-classical epistemology is 
distinguished by), he or she will be more likely to 
narrow the sphere of his/her uncertainty by the desire to 
proceed in cognition, while there is rather little 
probability to obtain full clarity. G. Behmann presented 
such kind of processes in the following way: the 
development of physics precisely reflects this 
phenomenon. Reasoning on the linear worldview of 
classical physics, which can keep the complexity of 
macroscopic natural phenomena to the simple structures 
of microworld, is split by the universum of modern 
physics’ supercomplex relationships [5]. Then, G. 
Behmann specifies that there is no unified perspective of 
such kind to fit the topic within the limits that are 
definite and acceptable by everyone [5]. 
Uncertainty as the background for cognitive activity 
appears as an irremovable component due to the active 
participation of a subject (subjects). The subject will 
inevitably execute a cognitive operation under these 
conditions; uncertainty will not disappear or clarify 
itself. Thus, risk appears as one more measurement of 
cognitive activity. In classical science the major priority 
of scientific research was connected with the truth, while 
nowadays, whenever strange it may seem, one of the 
major priorities of scientific cognition is risk. It means 
that the truth as the criterion for scientific cognition 
measurement is entirely eliminated, which means that, 
firstly, the truth becomes socio-culturally, socio-
politically, socio-economically, etc. engaged nowadays, 
secondly, the truth can be conditioned by different 
degrees of risk. And, what is very important, it is the 
most significant epistemological consequence of 
cognition in general and scientific consequence in 
particular. 
It should be added that when talking about applied 
science, the stated peculiarity of cognitive activity 
becomes even more actual. The development of 
technologies being implemented into industry and public 
activity, income orientation, etc. as the priorities of 
applied scientific research enhance the degree of risk for 
an individual and the society as a whole while the 
principles of the scientist’s activity are not actually 
distinguished in the spheres of fundamental and applied 
research. Essentially, nowadays there is the idea of 
developing technoscience, in which epistemological and 
technological components will be strongly connected. 
Fundamental research is impossible to be conducted with 
the lack of the suitable equipment and technology and it 
is rather difficult to develop technology without 
fundamental research. A scientist in this kind of research 
acts as a visionary or a foreteller, whose statements seem 
unexpected for people. It is rather interesting what G. 
Behmann compares scientific research with, when he 
states that modern science acts as a doer, as Cassandra 
taking measures [6]. 
It is obvious that a scientist in such conditions is 
involved in cognition activity, takes the risk. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the society, which allows 
scientists to participate in cognition activity under such 
conditions, takes more risk taking into account the 
, Web of Conferences 01007   (2016) DOI: 10.1051/
  




probable consequences of technical research results 
application. It is the reason why the authors want to 
indicate the problem of risk as an epistemological 
phenomenon in non-classical epistemology, while it is 
the epistemological side of risk, which is invisible but, 
therefore, more dangerous for the society. 
Risk is a multidimensional phenomenon: social, 
political, economic, legal, technological, etc [11]. But, as 
a rule, many risks can be specified and figured out. 
Economic risk can be calculated and evaluated, 
technological risk can be detailed and warned via 
instructions, it is possible to hedge against risk by law, 
etc. But in case of epistemological risk it is rather 
difficult to be anticipated, hedged, while it is impossible 
to regulate a mental activity stream. 
From the point of view of cognition, control over 
one’s own reflection is possible only on the basis of self-
control. A researcher should realize the degree of 
responsibility to the world and society in order to 
evaluate probable negative outcomes of his/her own 
ideas. In addition, it should be mentioned that risk as the 
measurement of human life and activities, and society 
functioning (including the epistemological aspect) does 
not necessarily imply negative outcomes. The essence of 
risk is connected to the fact that a person decides to take 
definite actions in situations of uncertainty in order to 
achieve a positive result. And, as he or she acts without 
clear understanding of all situation aspects, first of all, an 
epistemological one, the factor of risk appears as the 
factor of uncertainty enhancement. To illustrate the idea, 
the example with mass distribution of mobile telephony 
in our country can be drawn. Actually, the process began 
10 or 11 years ago (in 2002 – 2003). Today we 
frequently hear about potential threats to the health 
caused by a mobile phone in case of its improper use 
(hearing impairment, negative effect of electromagnetic 
phone on the brains, etc.). 
Risk appears when people race ahead too quick, 
focus on the future but not the present time. Otherwise, 
there would be no risk. People (society) tend to follow 
this proverb: go I know not whither and fetch I know not 
what. The most important is that initially this process is 
carried out epistemologically. According to E. Giddens, 
traditional cultures did not contain the notion of risk 
because they did not need it. Risk is not the same as 
danger or threat. The notion of risk is connected with 
active analyzing the danger from the view of the 
future outcomes. It is widely used only in the society 
oriented at the future and which perceives it as the 
territory to be conquered and colonized [12]. 
Society directed to the future, primarily needs the 
epistemologies of this kind (these are the main essence of 
non-classical epistemology and its major characteristics). 
This causes the decreased interest in the truth (the latter 
characterizes the quality of knowledge about the present 
moment reality). And it is the reason of the epistemological 
fields diversity (there are no rigid criteria of cognitive 
activity; it is considered either as constructivist activity or 
evolutionary transformation, or project activities, etc.). As 
V.G. Gorohov so deftly pointed out, the role of science in 
the modern society of “no-knowledge” is being changed 
relatively to the processes of risk formation [13]. And it is 
hard not to agree to V.G. Gorohov while the world is 
becoming more complex and we continue to live in it with a 
larger uncertainty. 
The degree of uncertainty (its growth) is better seen in 
the situation of specifying more and more risks with the 
growing role of a person. In particular, Australian 
researcher C. Althaus considered the perspectives of the 
epistemological risk aspect study and specified 5 types 
of risk. In three of them, understanding of the conditions 
for their originating and functioning were connected 
with the human factor and the decisions a human makes. 
The researcher distinguishes the following types of risk: 
subjective risk (psychological state of a person who feels 
uncertainty, doubt or anxiety about the result); objective 
risk (changes which happen when actual losses differ 
from the expected ones); actual risk (the combination of 
probable and negative consequences existing in the real 
world); observed risk (measuring the combination gained 
by creating a model of the real world); perceptive risk 
(rough evaluation of actual risk made by untrained 
society member) [14]. 
As we can judge from the given characteristics, at least 
subjective, observed and perceptive risks are conditioned 
by subjective reasons and depend on humans’ decisions. 
Probably, objective and actual risks are conditioned by 
this kind of connections as well. Concerning objective 
risk, such dependence is connected with the evaluation 
of the expected losses (it deals with the subjective 
construction); in case of actual risk we are talking about 
the dependence of probabilities and negative outcomes 
when they are combined by the subject.
An additional point is that epistemological nature of risk 
can be conditioned by the diversity of risks and, 
consequently, the necessity of evaluating and choosing 
them. The variety of risks and the necessity to choose the 
most suitable ones originate epistemological uncertainty. 
Thus, there is the necessity of risk as an inevitable condition 
of the epistemological strategy of a non-classical type. 
Actually, if we go back to the non-classical 
epistemology characteristics specified by U.S. Morkina 
given above in the paper, it becomes obvious that 
primarily these characteristics define epistemology as the 
process of the risky organization of cognitive activity 
while these are the subjective decisions it is made 
through. For example, the world of natural phenomena 
does not exist independently of an observer and our 
knowledge about it is subjective; scientific knowledge 
does not discover or store the genuine features of the 
outer world; scientific knowledge implies a kind of 
physical world description mediated by various cultural 
resources, etc. As it is clear from these characteristics, it 
is impossible to avoid a subject’s participation (and, 
therefore, his or her process of decision making), which 
originates risk as an epistemological phenomenon. 
Conclusion 
Thus, it should be stated that in the context of non-
classical epistemology risk becomes not only the 
specified condition for cognitive activity but also the 
characteristic distinguishing classical epistemology from 
, Web of Conferences 01007   (2016) DOI: 10.1051/
  




non-classical one. The most important thing risk 
incorporates as an epistemological phenomenon is the 
situation of uncertainty specified by the subject for the 
fastest possible overcoming of the present moment 
society development. The development speed and the 
desire to get “there” as rapidly as possible originate risk 
as a subjective epistemological strategy of searching 
something new and unknown. The possibility of gaining 
this result is connected with risk, but the loss of hope can 
lead to rather serious threats, but it is what the 
ambivalence of risk and the epistemological aspect of 
risk as a kind of cognitive ground for a subject all about. 
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